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verdict is not reversible error. It relied in part ol a statute which
prohibits reversal in the absence of error injuriously affecting appellant's
substantial rights," and in part on the Dunn case." Th Durn case,
however, was one where the defendant was acquitted of possessing
intoxicating liquor but convicted of maintaining a nuisanice by maintainling a place for the sale of intoxicating liquor. If defendant were to
stand convicted of larceny adm receiving the identical property as stolen
goods, as in the Bargesser and Gordon cases," it isbelieved that the
court would not hesitate to disregard as obiter the view expressed il
the principal case, and reverse.
REAL PROPERTY -

DOWER - EFFECT OF JUDGMENT
AND EXECUTION*
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Florida has laid clown the
unequivocal doctrine that a judgment and execution sale of a married
debtor's real estate not only divests him of all title thereto but also
completely extinguishes the wife's right of dower in the property.' This
represents a fundamcntal change in the attitude of the Florida court
toward this question and is completely contrary to the great weight of
authority in other jurisdictions.
As stated inl a standard authority, the majority rule-and erstwhile
Florida rule-i-s: "A sale of lands tinder execution against the husband
issued under a judgment rendered against him after the marriage will
not cut off the wife's dower 0 0 0 The law is settled in accordance
with the above 0 0 0 in those states where the common law rule prevails
and if the husband by his own conveyance cannot divest the wife's
dower, this cannot he done by a sale in execution under judgient
against him."'
There is no doubt that this rule represents the great weight of authority. The rule is so well settled that in recent yrears the courts have very
seldom beer called upon to determine the question; it is so well settled
that it is thus stated without qualification even ihi
encyclopedias of law.'
State after state has laid down this rule in the most unequivocal
language.'
- Criminal Procedure Act, See. 924.33, 1941 Statutes of Fla.
Note 6, supra.
"
Note 2, supra.
* In re Hester's Estate, 28 So (2d) 164, (Fla. 1946).
In re Hester's Estate, supra.
Annotation, 18 LRA 75, 78. Annot. cites Ind., Mo., Mass., N. J.,
Miss., Del., Minn.
* "Itis clear that at the common law sale under a judgment rendered
subsequent to marriage will not bar the widow of her dower." 21
Am. Jur. 153.
1 "It hardly seems necessary to cite authorities to the proposition
that at common law the wife could not be deprived of dower rights in
the real estate of her husband through sale upon execution under a
judgment obtained against him subsequently to marriage. * * * It has
"0
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Prior to the Hester decision this had long been regarded as settled
law in Florida. It was understood that a sale of the husband's property
by virtue of a judgment and execution against him was ineffective to
divest the wife's right of dower.' The decision it, the Pingree casewritten by Justice Terrell, the author of the Hester opinion-unequivocallv holds the rule to he that a sheriff's deed does not divest a
widow of her inchoate right of dower.'
Although the Hester case completely upsets what was regarded as
settled law in Florida, it does not specifically over-rule the earlier Florida cases which followed the great weight of authority. Instead, the
court has attempted to distinguish the Roan and Pingree cases and to
miniinize the previotus holdings on the somewhat equivocal ground that
they were "perhaps obiter."'
There are, of course, certain exceptions to the majority rule which
arc well recognized. The most common exception is foreclosure of a
mortgace u)on the husband's property in which the wife has joined.
I n such a case, if the wife is niade part;', foreclosure is effective to divest
dower." Another exception is a levy upon a clailm constitlting a charge
upon the real property of the husband pre-existing his marriage or upon
a purchase money mortgage or other clain which is a portion of the
transaction by which the property was acquired.' A third exception, iin
some jurisdictions, is in the event of a partition suit between tenants in
It has also been held that a condemonation proceeding is
common.'
effective to divest dower, but it is interesting to note that the reasoning
behind this holding seems to be that eminent domain is regarded as a
claim superior to and pre-existing any claim of dower."
Apart from these exceptions, however, it is the well recognized rule
that exection sale of the husband's property on a judgment against
been held repeatedly that the inchoate right of dower attaches at the
moment the husband's interest in the realty becomes fixed during coverture, so that his creditors cannot by any proceedings against him impair
or destroy the right. (Citing among others McMahon v. Russell, 17 Fla.
698)." Dayton v. Corser, 53 N.W. 717, 18 LRA 80 (Minn. 1892). "Sales
under execution leave the widow's right to dower unaffected." Owen v.
Slater, 26 Ala. 547 (1855). See also: Butler v. Fitzgerald, 61 N.W. 740,
27 LRA 252 (Nebr. 1895); Shell v. Duncan, 10 S.E. 330, 5 LRA 821
(S.C. 1889); Harmon v. Peery, 119 S.E. 126, 134 S.E. 701 (Va. 1923.
1926) ; Swartz v. Smole, 5 Pac (2d) 566, (Mont. 1931). Annot. 18LRA 75.
' McMahon v. Russell, 17 Fla. 698 (1880); Roan v. Holmes, 13 So. 339,
21 LRA 180 (1893); Pingree v. DeHaven, 105 So. 147 (1925).
4 "It is well settled that a sheriff's deed does not divest a widow of
her inchoate right of dower." (Citing Roan v. Holmes, supra.) Pingree
v. Def-aven, supra.
In re Hester's Estate, siupra.
r
* Roan v. Holmes, supra, McMahon v. Russell, vupra.
* Swartz v. Smole, supra; Sheffield v. Cook, 98 Atl. 161 (R.L. 1916).
Haggerty v. Wagner, 48 N.E. 388, 39 LRA 384 (Ind. 1897).
Briegef v. Briegel, 160 At!. 581 (Pa. 1931).
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him does not divest dower. That this rule is so strong as to have almost
the effect of statute is evidenced by the action of a number of states
which have specifically altered the majority, and common law, rule by
statutory emactment. Thus, under an Indiana law the wife's dower
interest was reduced from one-third to one-fifth in case of judgment
ard levy, but she could still claim ard receive anI assignment of dower
from the proceeds of the execution." Iowa also passed a statute nmillifying in part the majority rule.'
Florida has no such statute, and tile Florida court by differentiating
between tile Hester and Roan cases i effect re-affirmed that portion of
the rule which holds that a husband's voluntary conveyance without
joinder by the wife is not effective to divest the wife's dower."
The court, however, did riot follow through to the majority doctrine
that whenever tile husband cannot by his voluntary act divest the wife's
dower, it Callilot be divested by judgment against the husband followed
by judicial sale. The Florida court Stlua2rely holds instead that a j dgruent against the hLisband followed by execution and sale thereunder
extiimguishes the interest of both husbantd and wife. The court aldds that
the correctness of this holding is fortified by the fact that since the
decision in the Roan case a widow's estate has beeii changed by statlte
from a life estate to a fee.'" It is somewhat' difficult to follow this
reasoning since in most, if not all, of tile states following the majority
rule the widow is entitled, on the death of the husband, to a fee simple
interest." The Florida court also held that the statute granting dower
right must be read in pari rateria with Chapters 55 and 86, Florida
Statutes, 1941.' Careful study of these chapters fails to reveal anything
which by its terms modifies the widow's rights of dower or the
Co011n11011 law."
It therefore appears that the Florida court by its decision has low
abrogated that portion of the majority rule with respect to extilguishinent of dower by levy and execution and yet attempts to recognize that
portion of the majority rule which precldcs divestiture of dower hy
volintary action of the husband.
The net effect of this decision is to bring back to life tile essentials
Sullivan State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank. 146 N.E. 403 (Ind. 1925).
Knutson v. Rosenberger, 116 N.W. 687 (Iowa, 1908).
Roan v. Holmes, supra. Indeed, our dower statute embodies that
portion of the rule into our statutory law: "Dower shall be one-third part
in fee simple of the real property which was owned by her husband at
the time of his death or which he had before conveyed, whereof she had
not relinquished her right of dower as provided by law." Laws 1945,
c. 22847; See. 731.34 F.S.A. 1941.
"

T n re Hester's estate, supra.

Dayton v. Corser, supra.
" These statutes embrace "Judgments and Executions" and "Enforcement of Statutory Liens."
".The common law as to dower prevails in Florida except as modified by statute." Henderson v. Usher, 170 So. 846, 853, (Fla. 1936).
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of the comnnon law doctrine of fine and recovery which permits the
Wife's dower to be barred by fictitious judicial proceeding," despite the
fact that by statute fine and recovery has been abolished in Florida
since 1835.'
Under the ruling in the Hester case it is quite possible for a husband
to dispose of real property completely during coverture by a modification
oif the fine and recovery process. If a husband desires to divest himself
of real property not homestead in character without joinder in the conveyance by his wife, he can receive the consideration therefor as a "loan,"
giving a promissory note instead of a deed to the purchaser. The purchaser may then sue upon the note, secure a judgment, levy upon the
land, purchase at the judicial sale and take good title free of the wife's
dower right. The rule in the Hester case would validate the transaction unless the wife could prove fraud, which would be most difficult in
such a situation.
The Hester doctrine as it now stands may well tend to throw wide
the doors in Florida to manifest frauds upon the dower rights of
married wonwen.
"

2 Blackstone Comm. 137; 4 Kent Comm. 1.
Act Feb. 4, 1835, Par. 2; Sec. 689.08 F.S.A. 1941.

